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In this paper, we examine the prospects for base realignment and closure in Peru and 
develop an initial strategy for the realignment and closure process.  While previous 
research has focused primarily on the realignment and closure process in developed 
countries, we instead focus on the need for the realignment and closure process to 
complement the government’s objectives of democratic governance and economic 
growth.  Given concerns about the reemergence of internal threats, most notably the 
Shining Path and significant constraints on public finances, realignment and closure may 
have to proceed at a significant pace in the near term.  We argue that these conditions 
should not create an environment in which the requirements for the process to support the 
government’s objectives of improving transparency, accountability, and civil-military 
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Given the current drive by the Peruvian government to privatize public 
infrastructure and reprioritize public spending away from the defense sector to the social 
service sector, it is important to ask not only whether military base realignment and 
closure is necessary, but also how the realignment and closure process can proceed in a 
turbulent socio-economic environment.1  While there has been ample discussion on the 
realignment and closure process in the United States, there has been limited discussion on 
the course of such a process in developing countries.  An unanswered question is also 
how the base realignment and closure process should complement the other ongoing 
reforms in the Peruvian economy. 
In this paper we briefly review the current state of knowledge on the base 
realignment and closure process; discuss the positive and normative applications of 
infrastructure reduction theory; and present guiding principles for base realignment and 
closure in Peru.  As base realignment and closure moves to the forefront of policy options 
being considered by the Peruvian and other Latin American governments, an examination 
of the environment and the development of a framework for this process is quite timely.  
First, the focus on military infrastructure reduction appears to be fueled by the perceived 
need to increase social expenditures in response to the emerging preferences of the 
populace.  Second, the move to reduce military infrastructure can also be as a reaction to 
the involvement of the military in the political process over the past decades.  Third, the 
increased focus on the reduction and subsequent privatization of military infrastructure 
                                                 
1  Discussions with Peruvian officials occurred during the Institute for Defense Acquisition and Resource 
Management (IDARM) mission to Lima, Peru 1-13 April 2002.  The views expressed in this paper are the 
sole responsibility of the author and do not represent those of IDARM, the Naval Postgraduate School, the 
Department of the Navy, the United States Government, or the Peruvian Government. 
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appears to be fueled by the widespread belief that privatization is an effective tool for 
increasing economic efficiency.2  Base realignment and closure has come to be seen as a 
way to break the military’s influence on the economy by shifting resources to social 
protection expenditures and, in some cases, to lower levels of government.3 
Base realignment and closure affects not only the military but also those 
communities in close proximity to the bases subject to realignment and closure.  Benefits, 
in terms of reduced expenditures or gains in economic efficiency, accrue over the long 
run, leading to a timing problem of concentrated short-term costs and long-term benefits.  
In such an environment, the closure process may produce sub-optimal outcomes even if 
institutional constraints are part of the process.  Without an adequate understanding of the 
environment, the stakeholders, and the need for transparency, any realignment and 
closure process is likely to produce unwanted outcomes in Peru and other developing 
countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we briefly 
review the Peruvian macroeconomic and political environment as it applies to the 
potential base realignment and closure process.  In the third section, we discuss what 
economic theory suggests for the base realignment and closure process.  In the fourth 
section, we present a proposal for the guiding principles for the military infrastructure 
process in Peru.  The last section summarizes and offers some concluding thoughts. 
                                                 
2  Nellis (2002) argues that while the privatization process was flawed, for example, in the Czech Republic 
and Russia, it was a necessary process.  Poland, which delayed privatization, now finds itself burdened with 
a large number of unproductive and expensive state-owned enterprises.  We argue that these arguments are 
just as applicable to the countries of Latin and South America. 
3  In some ways, the arguments for the reduction of military infrastructure echo those for the 
decentralization of revenues and expenditures to subnational governments.  See Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980) for the classical exposition of how decentralization can control the Leviathan. 
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2.   The Peruvian Environment 
 
 To place the base realignment and closure process in the Peruvian context, it is 
important to first review the macroeconomic and political environment in Peru.  First, 
unlike the political environment in the United States and other developed countries, Peru 
does not have an established history of democratic governance.  Transparency and 
accountability remain weak relative to developed nations, although progress in these 
areas is a priority of the current President.  Second, while the realignment and closure 
process in the United States occurred in the midst of the longest economic expansion on 
record, the Peruvian macroeconomic environment is characterized by uncertainty and 
instability.  In the following subsections, we briefly review these conditions and discuss 
how they may influence the realignment and closure process. 
2.1 The Peruvian Political Environment 
 With the return to civilian, democratically elected governments in 1980 after 
twelve years of military rule, democratic governance appeared to take root again in Peru.  
The emergence of the Shining Path and the increased production of narcotics in Peru, 
however, led to the election of President Alberto Fujimori in 1990 based upon his 
promise to defeat the Shining Path and to modernize the Peruvian economy.  While the 
Fujimori administration was able to significantly curtail the activities of the Shining Path 
by the mid 1990s, Fujimori’s increasing reliance on authoritarian methods decreased 
domestic and international support for his administration.  Soon after election to his third 
term in 2000, allegations of corruption and election fraud, coupled with international 
pressure, forced President Fujimori from office. 
 4
 The collapse of President Fujimori’s government in late 2000 marked the first 
significant shift in the Peruvian political environment towards democratic governance in 
more than a decade.  While the Shining Path insurgency had been effectively neutralized, 
the growing corruption and oppressive nature of the Fujimori administration left Peru in a 
precarious political position.  Due to its close ties to the Fujimori administration, the 
military lacked political and popular support, a problem that was compounded by the 
military’s lack of political acumen and transparency. 
 An interim government oversaw the administration of the government until the 
election of President Alejandro Toledo in the spring of 2001.  As we will discuss in the 
next subsection, President Toledo faced a series of economic, as well as political 
challenges.  Economic growth stagnated in the last years of the Fujimori administration 
as domestic and foreign investment declined in response to the destabilization of the 
political environment.  President Toledo promised to continue the privatization of the 
Peruvian economy; fiscal restraint and a reorientation of public resources to social 
expenditures; reinvigorating tourism; and promoting economic developing through the 
simulation of the industrial and construction sectors of the economy.  In hindsight, this 
broad-based agenda may have raised expectations to the point where they could not be 
realistically fulfilled by the Toledo administration. 
 Shortly after President Toledo took office in August 2001, polls of public opinion 
noted a sixty-percent approval rating with only fifteen-percent of those survey 
disapproving of the President’s performance (Latin Source, 2002a).  Over the course of 
the next sixteen months, President’s Toldeo’s popularity declined significantly, to 25% in 
March 2002.  More telling, however, is the significant increase in his disapproval ratings 
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to 65% in March 2002.  Many analysts attribute this sharp decline in popularity to three 
factors, two of which are political: (1) the President’s inability to deliver on his wide-
ranging set of campaign promises; and (2) his perceived continuous inconsistent 
behavior; and (3) the failure of the economy to rebound from the Fujimori recession 
(Latin Source, 2002a,b; ABN-Amro, 2002). While the President’s approval ratings have 
plummeted during the first third of his administration, we believe that the political 
environment in Peru has improved significantly. 
 First, while opposition to the continued privatization of the electrical 
infrastructure has increased, the process has continued to move forward.  More 
importantly, there is a viable political opposition that has put forward its own economic 
plan for Peru, contributing to the overall level of debate on the pace and breadth of 
economic reform.  Second, in March 2002, Congress passed the second reading of the 
amendment to the Constitution designed to start the process of fiscal decentralization and 
creating a new series of regional governments.4  Politically, the creation of new, 
autonomous governments should promote democratic governance and transparency over 
the long run.5  An unanswered political question, however, is how the regional 
governments will interact with the Ministry of Defense with respect to base realignments 
and closures.  We argue that these, and other, political developments illustrate Peru’s 
positive transition to a more transparent, democratic society. 
 
                                                 
4 The new regional governments will have political, economic, and administrative autonomy in all 
decisions pertaining to the jurisdiction, decisions which will include the promotion of regional 
development, investment, and public services (Latin Source, 2002b). 
5 See Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (1997, 2002a, 2002b) for discussions on the relationship between 
fiscal decentralization, democratic governance, and economic growth. 
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2.2 The Peruvian Economic Environment 
 The election of President Fujimori in 1990 marked a turning point for the 
Peruvian economy.  Over the next decade, significant privatizations were conducted in 
the telecommunications, mining, and utilities industries.  Foreign direct investment 
increased significantly in response to improvements in the security environment and the 
market-oriented policies of the Fujimori administration.  The period of 1994 to 1997 
marked the high point of the Peruvian economy during the Fujimori administration, with 
low inflation and strong economic growth.  After 1997, however, economic growth 
stagnated.  First, in 1997, the financial crisis in Brazil and an El Nino had a dramatic 
impact on economic growth.  In 1998, the Asian financial crisis adversely affected 
external trade and foreign direct investment.  In 1999 and early 2000, the instability of 
the Fujimori administration led to the continuation of the relatively poor performance of 
the Peruvian economy. 
 With the collapse of the Fujimori administration, economic performance 
increased in the last half of 2000 from an annual rate of 0.9 percent of real GDP in 1999 
to 3.1 percent in 2000.  Inflation remained under control at an annual rate of 3.7 percent 
in 1999 and 2000.6  With the election of President Toledo in 2001, expectations were 
high that economic growth would continue.  The recession in the United States and other 
OECD countries, however, quickly dampened these expectations.  It is hoped that 
economic growth will rebound in 2002, with forecasted growth rates between 3 and 4 
percent of GDP.7 
                                                 
6 See World Development Report, World Bank (2002) and IMF (2000). 
7 See Latin Source (2002a, 2002b), World Bank (2002), and IMF (2000) for further information on 
macroeconomic performance in Peru. 
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 With respect to the proposed base realignment and closure process, the 
macroeconomic environment and fiscal position of the Peruvian government is inferior to 
that of the United States at the beginning of its realignment and closure process in the 
1990s.  While inflation remains under control and growth is forecast for 2002, the fiscal 
position of the central government remains uncertain.  First, one of the primary objectives 
of the government is the reduction of the fiscal deficit, from 3.2 percent of GDP in 2000, 
2.5 percent of GDP in 2001, to 1.9% of GDP in 2002.  We believe that this objective will 
limit any potential additional resources that could be utilized for base realignment and 
closure.  Second, the central government’s revenue stream remains unstable.  Congress, 
for example, recently lowered the penalty on tax arrears from 15% to 6% or the inflation 
rate, whichever is lower.8  We believe that this creates moral hazard as the penalty rate is 
now significantly below the commercial bank rate for business and individual loans, 
creating an incentive for taxpayers to accrue tax arrears as a substitute for bank debt.  
Suggestions of a tax amnesty have also contributed to a decline in real tax revenues.  
Uncertainty over what revenue instruments will be devolved to the new regional 
governments adds to the overall instability in central government revenues.  
 We argue that the continued instability in the central government’s revenue 
stream, coupled with the President’s promises of a shift towards social expenditures, will 
continue to constrain resources available to the Ministry of Defense.  Given the 
uncertainties in the strategic environment with the potential reemergence of the Shining 
                                                 
8 Another example is the continuation of the tax incentives in Peru’s Amazon region.  It is estimated that 
government receives 1% of GDP less in revenues due to these tax incentives (ABN-Armo, 2002). 
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Path, we believe that operational requirements may also increase over the short-term.9  If 
operational requirements do increase, closing unneeded bases and realigning activities 
and resources will increase in importance.  The need for operational expenditures, 
however, may further limit public resources available for realignment and closure in the 
near-term.  Any process that fails to recognize the potential resource and, as noted in the 
previous section, political constraints is likely to fail.  With this in mind, we now turn to a 
discussion of incentive theory and the base realignment and closure literature.    
          
3. What does theory suggest about the realignment and closure process? 
 
 We must first note that there is a paucity of theoretical models of the base 
realignment and closure process.  Public choice theory, however, suggests that the 
decision on the level of public expenditures needed to operate a specific level of public 
infrastructure and employment will be subject to political influence and the ability of the 
government to credibly commit to a policy.  Given that realignment and closure of 
military bases directly affects military infrastructure and employment, we argue in this 
section that the realignment and closure process can be discussed within a public choice 
framework. 
 The challenge facing the President, the Congress, and other interested 
stakeholders is to create a system of incentives to solicit the timely and accurate submittal 
of cost and output data which can then be used in the base realignment and closure 
                                                 
9 It was the consensus of the Ministry of Defense officials interviewed that operational requirements will 
also increase due to the increasing conflict between the FARC and Columbian government; the potential 
reemergence of the Shining Path movement; and providing assistance to the United States’ war on 
terrorism. 
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process.   The Ministry of Defense (MOD), on the other hand, may be focused on 
objectives other than cost minimization or output maximization.  The MOD may instead 
be focused on the objective of obtaining budgets that provide as much residual funding as 
possible in excess of the true cost of providing a given level of output.10  Given the 
uncertainty in the government’s revenue stream and corresponding instability in the 
expenditure stream to the MOD, we believe that the likelihood of the MOD overstating 
its costs is more likely in developing than developed countries.  Providing the 
stakeholders in the process with accurate information on costs and outputs may pose a 
threat to this objective.  Given the unique nature of each of the Services’ missions, it is 
likely that only the Services and the MOD knows the true cost of the output in question.  
The President’s administration and Congress, in this case, may be dependent on the MOD 
for the provision of cost and output data.  Given the asymmetric nature of cost-output 
data and that the MOD is a monopsonist, public choice theory suggests that the MOD 
may be able to secure a budget that is greater than that desired by the stakeholders 
(Niskanen, 1971; Miller, 1977; Moene, 1986; Mueller, 1989; Wintrobe, 1997; Claar, 
1998). 11 
 One of the challenges of the realignment and closure process is to explicitly link 
resources to outputs (and outcomes, if necessary) to rank military facilities to objectively 
determine which facilities will remain open and which will close.  The President and 
                                                 
10  Migue and Belanger (1974) refer to an agency’s budget surplus as discretionary spending that may be 
used to purchase items not directly related to the production of an agency’s output.  See Wyckoff’s (1990) 
behavioral analysis of budget-surplus maximizing agencies. 
11  Niskanen (1971) and Miller (1977) impose an additional constraint where the department’s sponsor 
presents a take-it-or-leave-it budget proposal.  Mueller (1989) and Claar (1998) are among those that have 
relaxed this assumption.  Imposing an additional constraint on the type of the budget proposal does not, 
given the other assumptions, appear to affect the ability of the department to secure a budget greater than 
that desired by its sponsor. 
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Congress could not, however, enter into a contract with the MOD for a non-quantifiable 
outcome called “national security” and subsequently reduce military personnel and 
infrastructure to an amount necessary to achieve this objective.  When the outcome is not 
quantifiable, the principals (Congress and the President) would have to use output or 
quantifiable criteria (maneuver space, number of ranges, aircraft facilities, etc) as a 
means of telling the agent (MOD) what must be done and to rank bases accordingly for 
the purposes of realignment and closure.  Theory suggests, however, that performance 
measures may not always provide the agent accurate incentives and the agent may thus 
engage in activities that the principal, if they had the agent’s information, would consider 
suboptimal (Baker, 1992). 
 In order to solicit accurate information from the Services and the MOD in support 
of the realignment and closure process, the President and Congress could consider 
altering the incentives that influence the behavior of the Services and the MOD.  The 
incentives-contracts literature is replete with examples of agents modifying their behavior 
in response to new incentive schemes.12  The current system in Peru inadvertently creates 
a perverse incentive that rewards agents for budget-maximizing behavior (through static 
or increased funding levels in the next fiscal year) and penalizes agents engaging in cost-
saving behaviors.  This behavior is exacerbated by the drive to shift resources away from 
the MOD and the instability in the public revenue stream.13  We are concerned that this 
underlying incentive creates a significant obstacle to the MOD’s active participation in 
                                                 
12  See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) for an analysis of multitask principal agent incentives and 
contracts.  Wintrobe (1997) reviews the literature on bargaining games between government agencies and 
their sponsors while Prendergast (1999) reviews the literature on the provision of incentives in firms.  
Prendergast (2000) examines the tradeoffs between risk and incentives. 
13 Anecdotal evidence suggests that while the MOD constructs annual budgets, its actual spending is 
dependent upon monthly revenue collections, shortening the planning horizon from an annual to monthly 
basis. 
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the realignment and closure process.  We believe that this type of behavior could be 
attenuated by allowing agents to keep a portion of non-expended resources for 
discretionary activities and to transfer a portion of the savings realized from infrastructure 
reduction to their operational budgets.   
 Using cost and performance data to determine which bases should be realigned or 
closed would also require that the President and Congress move towards a process that 
emphasizes clear, concise objectives, and methodology.  The principals can, in the 
current system, contract with each service on the quantity of output and the price per unit 
of output.  However, in the presence of asymmetric information on costs, monopolistic 
supply, and the principal contracting on output and unit cost, the welfare-maximizing unit 
price will be above the agent’s true marginal cost per unit of output (Claar, 1998).  The 
contracting process would also have to consider uncertainty in the demand for and 
production of national security.  The principal, in order to provide the agent with 
incentives to accurately report their cost information, may have to pay a subsidy to elicit 
accurate information.  It is likely, given the literature on incentives and public sector 
performance, that the principals would have to offer pricing terms in excess of the true 
marginal cost of the MOD to effectively solicit cost and performance information to 
support the realignment and closure process.  This will be difficult given the apparent 
reluctance of the MOD to release detailed budget information to the President’s 
administration and Congress.  If the MOD fails to participate, however, the objectives of 
improved civil-military relations and efficiency in the use of public resources will be 
difficult to achieve.  The question is two-fold:  what metrics should be used, and how can 
the MOD be swayed to actively particpate in the realignment and closure process? 
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The MOD may, in fact, propose metrics (maneuver acreage, tank miles, runway 
lengths, number of hospital beds) with which it is most comfortable.  Public choice 
theory suggests, given the conditions we have previously discussed, that agents are likely 
to take action to improve their performance in terms of familiar metrics, even if such 
actions may detrimental to those outcomes that are of interest to their stakeholders 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).  Excessive quantities of goods and services whose 
characteristics are quantifiable and easily monitored may be produced as agents exploit 
principals who lack the knowledge on the true demand for public goods and services and 
the costs of producing them.  These behaviors favor programs for which metrics are 
readily available over those whose outcomes are more difficult to quantify.    Moreover, 
in the presence of asymmetric information, the MOD and its subordinate Services may 
also have the incentive to produce highly differentiated goods and services with 
characteristics that do not lend themselves to being measured or monitored (Niskanen, 
1971).  Whatever metrics are proposed must be quantifiable and highly correlated with 
the objectives of the national government.  This discussion suggests that effort must be 
initially directed to develop “consensus-oriented” metrics, that is, metrics which can be 
quantified and managed by the MOD and are acceptable to the President’s administration 
and Congress in support of their objectives of improved transparency and civil-military 
relations.  More importantly, as we discuss below, once the metrics are agreed upon, the 
MOD and the stakeholders must credibly commit to their use in support of the 
government’s objectives. 
 Bielling (1996) constructs a two-sector model of labor force adjustment that 
examines labor force adjustment after a favorable external shock to the security 
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environment.  The favorable external shock, in effect, lowers the marginal benefit to 
national security provided by military personnel and thus induces a reallocation of 
resources from the military sector to the civilian sector.  Adjustment, however, is costly.  
Given adjustment costs, sufficient incentives must exist for military employees to move 
to the civilian sector.  Bielling (1996) argues that it is only possible to achieve the 
second-best equilibrium if the government can credibly commitment to the reduction in 
military operations.  In the absence of credible commitment, expectations will form that 
the actual level of post-shock military employment will exceed that announced by the 
government.  These expectations are fulfilled in the resulting equilibrium where the 
government provides a level of protection to military employees that exceeds the second-
best level.14  If the Peruvian government’s fails to credibly commit to the realignment and 
closure process, then the outcome of the process is likely to be sub-optimal with respect 
to the government’s objectives of reallocating resources from the military to social 
protection sector while maintaining the current level of domestic security. 
 Our survey of the economics literature suggests that credible commitment is an 
important facet in the realignment and closure process.  By institutionalizing credible 
commitment, the possibility of achieving an outcome that is superior to that in the 
absence of credible commitment is enhanced.  In the United States, credible commitment 
was institutionalized in the form of the independent Base Realignment and Closure 
Commission.  Commitment was also enhanced by the stipulation that Congress could 
only accept or reject the Commission’s closure and realignment list; partial acceptance or  
                                                 
14 One might argue that anecdotal evidence of this effect exists in the United States where the Department 
of Defense continues to argue for further rounds of base reduction.  These arguments would suggest that 
the previous rounds failed to reduce military infrastructure to the second-best equilibrium.  This question 
awaits future research. 
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modifications of the list were not allowed.  We also believe that economic theory 
suggests that without the proper incentives, MOD participation in the realignment and 
closure process will be limited.  Also of concern is the perceived relative strength of the 
Services to the MOD.  It may be that the MOD must also incentivize the Service’s to 
participate much like how the President’s administration and Congress must incentivize 
MOD’s participation in the realignment and closure process.  Incentivization could be in 
the form of tracking and transferring a portion of the long-term savings.15  Given the 
current instability in the macroeconomic environment and uncertainly with respect to 
resources, we argue that if the President and Congress would credibly commit to a level 
of expenditures for national defense after the completion of the realignment and closure 
process, this would provide a positive incentive for the participation of the MOD and the 
Services.  We believe that such a commitment should be conditional on the active 
participation of the MOD and Services in the process, starting with release of budget 
information to support transparency and the negotiation on what metrics will be used in 
the decision making process. 
 
4.   Principles for base realignment and closure in Peru 
 Having briefly surveyed the economics literature and noting that credible 
commitment and incentives can play an important role in the military infrastructure 
reduction process, we now turn to a discussion of what should be the guiding principles 
for the process in Peru.  While the principles discussed in this section do not exhaust the 
                                                 
15 We recognize that public expenditure systems typically do not track savings over time, however, we 
believe that this could be accomplished if this task was in the interest of the stakeholders in the realignment 
and closure process. 
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potential guidelines, we believe that these are the most important and should form the 
foundation of the realignment and closure process.  
4.1 Expectations, costs, and the process of infrastructure reduction 
 Managing Expectations:  The reduction and privatization of military 
infrastructure, we argue, is often mistakenly thought to result in a short-term reduction in 
operations and maintenance expenditures.  Experience in the United States and other 
countries has shown that, in fact, that the realignment and closure process results in 
substantial short-term costs and significant shortfalls in expected revenues from 
privatization and land sales.16  Unrealistic expectations can, when tax revenues are not 
rising in response to an improving macroeconomic environment and popular expectations 
have been shaped by promises of increased social protection expenditures, seriously 
jeopardize the conduct of the realignment and closure process.  We thus argue that, even 
before the parties start to discuss the objectives and metrics of the process, they must first 
deflate expectations on the short-term savings.17    
 Estimating and Managing Costs:  If short-term savings in terms of reduced 
operational and maintenance expenditures are likely to be less than expected, what can 
we say about realignment and closure costs?  With pre-announced expectations that a 
reduction in military infrastructure will realize sufficient savings to fuel an increase in 
social protection expenditures, the task of accurately estimating and managing 
realignment and closure costs is likely to be the most contentious part of the process.  
Assuming that the Peruvian military cannot simply “lock the gates and walk away,” we 
                                                 
16 See, for example, GAO (insert all reports here) 
17 The parties should also explicitly recognize that public expenditure systems are not designed to track 
savings over time and that savings projections should be treated as estimates, subject to change in response 
to the macroeconomic and security environment. 
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can realistically expect that realignment and closure costs will exist and, in some cases, 
will be substantial.18  Military personnel and equipment will need to be transferred to 
receiving bases; receiving bases will, in some cases, will require additional capital for 
expansion; bases tapped for closure will require some amount of preparation for transfer 
to the civilian sector; and so on.  Given the absence of local governments and the relative 
strength of the central government in Peru to regional governments, many of the legal 
issues surrounding the closure and transfer process in the United States will not appear in 
the Peruvian context.  On the other hand, the issues of retraining of civilian and military 
personnel and the economic impact on local communities will undoubtedly pose some of 
the same challenges for the Peruvian government. 
 Of concern are the potential costs for environmental remediation.  Given the 
current commitment of the Toledo administration to enhancing social welfare, we can 
realistically expect that the defense establishment will be unable to abandon unused or 
unneeded infrastructure without remediation.  The removal of unexploded ordinance, 
contaminated soil, and other hazardous materials will require the commitment of 
resources; resources that we have already argued will not be readily forthcoming in the 
short-term from the closure of military bases.  We believe that Peru can learn from the 
experience of the United States and explicitly include environmental remediation costs as 
one of the criteria for determining which infrastructure should be realigned or closed.  
We also argue that the Peruvian government should explicitly recognize that the presence 
of these costs will further dampen the prospects for savings in the short-term.  To do 
                                                 
18  For the United States, between 1990 and 2001, approximately $23 billion has been spent on base 
realignment and closure.  Only recently have net savings been realized, and these are lower than expected 
due to environmental remediation costs.  
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otherwise is to jeopardize the potential of achieving an efficient outcome from the 
realignment and closure process. 
 Process Framework:  While we can draw upon the experience of the United 
States and other NATO countries with respect to the military infrastructure reduction 
process, we must also be cognizant of the Peru’s limitations in terms of resources and 
analytical infrastructure.  Simply importing the methodology and process framework 
used in the United States’ base realignment and closure process is not feasible given the 
resource and analytical constraints.  Civilian officials, for example, currently have no 
means of independently confirming military expenditure - the number of soldiers, for 
instance, is reported only by the military itself, and the numbers to Congress offered vary 
widely.  This environment is further exacerbated by the weakness of the legislative 
branch relative to the executive branch.  In some cases, Congress must communicate 
through the President’s administration to officials in the MOD and security agencies.  
Care must also be taken to complement the ongoing efforts in the restructuring and 
reform of the armed forces and to bolster the government’s efforts in the areas of 
transparency and accountability. 
Ideally, Peru would exploit the existing institutions which are already discussing 
issues related to the restructuring and reform of the military.  One option is the creation 
of a committee within the Comisión de Reestructuración de las Fuerzas Armadas 
(Commission for the Restructuring of the Armed Forces) for the specific purpose of base 
realignment and closure.  Exercising this option would bolster the standing and efforts of 
the Comisión with respect to the restructuring of the Peruvian armed forces and integrate 
the base realignment and closure effort with the overall effort to transform the Peruvian 
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military.  A second option is to create a separate, independent Comisión for the express 
purpose of realigning, closing, and in some cases, opening military bases in response to 
the shifting security and resource environment.  While an independent Comisión would 
increase the transaction costs associated with the infrastructure reduction process in that it 
would need to coordinate its activities with the restructuring Comisión, it is possible that 
an independent base Comisión would increase the likelihood of independent and 
transparent analysis. 
While an independent realignment and closure Comisión would closely mirror the 
methodology of the United States, we do not believe that an independent Comisión is 
required in the Peruvian context.  First, the transactions costs of an independent 
commission may be significant given the potential impact of realignment and closure 
decisions on the final force structure and resources of the Peruvian armed forces.  We 
believe that this requires close coordination between those working on issues related to 
the restructuring of the armed forces and the reduction of military infrastructure.  Second, 
unlike the United States, the Congress is weak relative to the President’s administration; 
the President can thus pre-commit to accept and enforce the recommendations of the 
realignment and closure staff.  As previously discussed, pre-commitment is necessary 
(but not sufficient) to achieve the most efficient outcome from the infrastructure 
reduction process.  Finally, given the government’s objectives of increasing transparency 
and accountability, we believe that integrating the realignment and closure process within 
the existing institutional framework supports these objectives.  While an independent 
Comisión would also support these objectives, it may be best, given the nature of the 
political environment, to have fewer rather than more agents involved in the realignment 
 19
and closure process.  We now turn to the specific issues of transparency, accountability, 
and independence with respect to military infrastructure process. 
4.2 Transparency, accountability, and independence 
 As previously noted, our discussion is rooted in the Peruvian government’s 
objectives of improving transparency and accountability in support of its overarching 
goal of improving democratic governance.  Improving transparency implies that 
decisions related to military infrastructure are not only viewed by the public but that the 
public takes part in the process.  Improving accountability implies that whatever 
decisions are reached during the process that these decisions could be independently 
replicated if a reasonable person had access to the same data and methodology.  We must 
also remain cognizant of the current lack of popular support for the Peruvian military and 
the absence of credible information flows from the Peruvian military to other parts of the 
government and the public.  As we have argued before, the macroeconomic and political 
environment in Peru is much different from that in the United States during its 
infrastructure reduction process.  
Simple, concise, objective criteria:  While there are several potential areas for the 
Peruvian government to improve its performance in the area of transparency, we believe 
that the most significant gains exist in the area of civil-military relations.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that distrust pervades the civil-military relationship and that much 
work remains to be done before the defense establishment is an integral part of the 
government’s decision making process.  This being said, the development of simple, 
concise, and objective criteria in support of the base realignment and closure process is 
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another necessary step in support of the government’s objective of improving 
transparency. 
Rather than developing criteria for each type of major facility as was done in the 
United States, we believe that it would be more economical to develop a single set of 
criteria for each Service.  First, the number of bases and other facilities to be analyzed is 
substantially less than that considered in each round of base realignment and closure in 
the United States.  Second, the amount of resources available to support the analysis of 
military reduction in support of the realignment and closure process is again substantially 
less than that of the United States and other countries.  Developing the criteria and 
gathering the data necessary to accurately rank military facilities will require resources; 
and the amount of resources required is, at a minimum, proportional to the complexity of 
the criteria.  Finally, criteria which can be easily understood by the President’s 
administration, the Congress, and the public, supports the objective of improving 
transparency.  In Table 1, we present a stylized set of criteria that could be used as a 
starting point for the discussion of criteria for the Peruvian infrastructure reduction 
process.    
Decision making transparency and accountability:   As we have discussed 
throughout this paper, improving transparency and accountability will reap not only 
economic benefits but also support the Peruvian government’s goal of improving 
democratic governance.  Following this argument, the subjective weights applied to the 
final criteria should be made publicly available.  Furthermore, alternative weighting 
schemes should be considered and also made available to the public to test the sensitivity 
of the base realignment and closure rankings.  If the criteria are simple, concise, and 
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objective and the data, criteria, and weights are made publicly available, then we could 
reasonably expect that the base rankings could be replicated by a reasonable individual. 
To enhance the transparency and accountability of the process, we believe that the 
Peruvian government should pre-commit to either accept or reject the realignment and 
closure list in its entirety.   The committee should also be independently appointed by the 
President and Congress and should contain subject matter experts from the Ministry of 
Defense, Ministry of Finance and Economy, and institutions not affiliated with the 
Peruvian government.  Given the current interaction of the Peruvian government with the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other international donor agencies, the 
government should also consider providing non-voting memberships to these institutions.  
Oversight by these organizations, we believe, can only help to enhance the accountability 
and transparency of the process.  The participation of international organizations may 
also result in the provision of technical assistance and resources to support the 
realignment and closure process. 
Public accountability and input:  Throughout this paper, we have stressed the 
importance of improving public participation in the decision making process through 
increased transparency and accountability.  We strongly believe that the meetings related 
to the topic of military infrastructure reduction should not only be open to the public but 
that the public should be allowed to participate in the process.  Given the drive by the 
Peruvian government to decentralize revenues and expenditures, the base realignment 
and closure process could be a forum for enhancing public participation in the 
governance process.  Clearly, much work remains to be done in this area, and there is 
anecdotal evidence on the reluctance of the military to engage their civilian counterparts, 
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but we fear that without public participation, the outcome will be suboptimal.  Base 
realignment and closure can succeed without public participation but the government’s 
goal of improving democratic governance will not be achieved if the public is excluded 
from the process. 
 
5. Summary and Concluding Thoughts 
In this paper we have attempted to provide a set of guiding principles for the base 
realignment and closure process in Peru.  Given the drive of the President to reorient 
fiscal resources from national defense to social protection, base realignment and closure 
will happen in Peru.  Whether the military actively participates in the realignment and 
closure process may determine whether the outcomes from the process are satisfactory 
from the military’s perspective.  In other words, to maintain a level of resources and 
infrastructure necessary to support operational requirements, the military may finally 
have to let go of their desire to remain apart from the budget and governance process in 
Peru. 
Base realignment and closure affects not only the military but also those communities 
in close proximity to the bases subject to realignment and closure.  As we have discussed 
in this paper, the process suffers from an incentive compatibility problem: benefits, in 
terms of reduced expenditures or gains in economic efficiency, accrue over the long run, 
leading to a timing problem of concentrated short-term costs and long-term benefits.  
Without institutional constraints on the independence of the process, the objectivity of the 
criteria, and the pre-commitment on the part of the President, we believe that the closure 
process will produce sub-optimal outcomes in terms of resource availability and 
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economic efficiency.  The task before Peru is to develop these institutions to support a 
transparent, accountability, and democratically-oriented base closure process. 
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Table 1 
Criteria for Discussion 
 
Criteria Sub-Criteria 
Mission Requirements  
 Maneuver acreage 
 Firing ranges 
 Impact areas 
 Border coverage 
  
Facilities and Environment  
 Environmental capacity 
 Environmental encroachment 
 Percent permanent facilities 
 Capacity for new facilities 
 Barracks space and other housing 
 Average age of facilities 
  
Cost  
 Environmental remediation estimate 
 Annual operating cost  / Personnel 
 Military construction costs / Personnel 
 Allowances and other pay 
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